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2Abstract
This essay examines the recent Planet of the Apes films through the lens of recent research in primatology. The 
films lend imaginary support to primatologist Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism; however, the 
movies also show that truly moral emotions outstrip the cognitive capacities of the great apes. The abstract 
moral principles employed by the ape community in the movie require the ability to understand and apply a 
common underlying explanation to perceptually disparate situations; in contrast, recent research in comparative 
psychology demonstrates that the great apes lack this capacity. Since the capacity for abstraction is required 
on even the most basic version of moral sentimentalism—Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules account—the lack 
of the capacity for abstraction reveals a qualitative distinction between primate social behavior and human 
morality. 
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Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the 
parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably 
acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers 
had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man. 
(Darwin [1871] 1981, 71–72)
To name an act good or bad, ultimately implies that it is apt to give rise 
to an emotion of approval or disapproval in him who pronounces the 
judgment... (Westermarck 1906, 4)
Ape separate weak. Ape together strong... Ape not kill ape. (Wyatt 
2011; Reeves 2014)
Apes with a Moral Code? Primatology, Moral 
Sentimentalism, and the Evolution of Morality in 
The Planet of the Apes
Paul Carron
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Introduction 
The Planet of the Apes is a classic American science fiction film. Released in 1968, 
it received critical acclaim and box office success (“Top-US-Grossing” 2015). Its inclusion 
in the National Film Registry by the Library of Congress for cultural, historical, and 
aesthetic significance evidences its lasting impact. The original film spawned four sequels 
and several other spinoffs. This film captivated audiences not only for its technical 
achievements, such as its cinematography, realistic ape costumes, and haunting score, but 
also for the interesting philosophical questions it raised.
In 2001, a reboot of the franchise appeared in theaters—The Planet of the Apes 
directed by Tim Burton—that had relative box office success but failed critically and did 
little to advance the franchise’s more interesting philosophical and cultural importance. 
Another reboot of the franchise appeared in 2011. Thus far, the most recent reboot has 
generated two films, The Rise of the Planet of the Apes and Dawn of the Planet of the 
Apes. Whereas the original film tries to debunk various aspects of human exceptionalism 
by exposing the human propensities toward racism, classism, and religious ideology, Rise 
and Dawn imaginatively depict great apes developing human capacities such as reflective 
consciousness, emotional intelligence, and moral reasoning.1 
Recent advances in primatology and comparative psychology reveal that many of 
those imaginative depictions are not so fanciful; rather, the portrayals reflect our growing 
understanding of nonhuman primate cognitive capacities, an understanding due in large 
part to the careful research, spanning over 30 years, of primatologist Frans de Waal. 
Putting the recent reboots into dialogue with current scientific research like de Waal’s 
illuminates the extent to which human morality is rooted in primate social behavior and 
cognitive capacities. However, careful examination of that research and its philosophical 
framework reveals how human moral reasoning and action far outstrip the capacities of 
nonhuman primates. 
In particular, examining what I label de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism 
sheds light on the fictitious story of the reboots. Briefly, moral sentimentalism is the 
idea that moral judgments stem from a person’s reactive attitudes—sympathy, anger, 
compassion, resentment, etc. When a person judges that an action is morally wrong, 
this judgment happens in part because the agent experiences—or believes she should 
experience—certain reactive attitudes in response to the action in question. 
Despite evidence that supports de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism, certain 
aspects of the reboots go beyond de Waal’s theory to reveal a fundamental problem with 
1. Whenever I refer to the “reboots,” I am referring to Rise and Dawn.
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his account. The reboots portray the apes as developing the capacity for abstract moral 
reasoning, seen in their ability to adopt and apply abstract moral principles. De Waal 
does not explain how the common ancestor of the great apes and humans developed this 
capacity. Furthermore, recent research suggests that, notwithstanding all their profound 
intellectual capacities, the great apes lack the capacity for abstract moral reasoning. Even 
given all that we have in common with our primate cousins, a qualitative difference 
remains between primate social behavior and human morality. I conclude that despite 
its explanatory power, de Waal’s theory fails to account for the evolution of a distinctly 
human morality. 
My argument proceeds as follows. In section one, I briefly outline the tenets of a 
recent novel articulation of moral sentimentalism, as it is relevant to the films and for de 
Waal’s primatology. In section two, I briefly overview the plot of the reboots, stressing 
scenes that display how the moral community evolves. The movies emphasize, for 
example, the importance of emotions and abstract moral principles for moral community, 
themes that later reemerge when discussing de Waal’s work. In section three, I discuss 
what I define as de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism (EMS). De Waal’s EMS has 
two main features: 1) reactive attitudes, such as sympathy and empathy; and 2) moral 
norms that contribute to communal harmony. Major elements of de Waals’ EMS are 
highlighted in the films.
Finally, section four contains the crux of my argument. De Waal argues that human 
morality evolved from primate social behavior, a theory creatively depicted in the 
reboots. However, the movies make clear a crucial aspect of human morality: abstract 
moral principles. De Waal also understands the importance of abstraction when he 
discusses the philosopher Adam Smith’s notion of the “impartial spectator”—the view 
that when making moral decisions, we must abstract ourselves from our particular 
viewpoint to see the situation as an impartial person would see it. However, de Waal’s 
account fails to provide evidence of how nonhuman primates develop a similar capacity 
for disinterestedness or applying abstract rules to the community as a whole. The ability 
to conceptualize and verbalize abstract notions differs radically between primates and 
humans. Even a more restrained “sentimental rules” account requires an agent to be 
able to distinguish between morals and conventions. Further, the agent must be able 
to recognize generalizable norms or principles regarding harm; recent research offers, 
however, that nonhuman primates lack the capacity for abstraction or generalization. 
I conclude that a qualitative distinction remains between primate social behavior and 
human morality.
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Section One: The “Sentimental Rules” Account of Moral Sentimentalism 
I am arguing that the most recent Planet of the Apes films present an imagined 
version of Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism. Therefore it is first 
necessary to understand the ethical theory referred to as moral sentimentalism. At the 
most basic level, moral sentimentalism is the ethical theory that ethical responses stem 
from emotions and feelings (de Waal 2006, 18). Sentimentalism stresses “empathetic 
caring as the touchstone of virtuous agency” (Cox 2006, 506). As the philosopher David 
Hume puts it, “The final sentence . . . which pronounces characters or actions amiable or 
odious, praiseworthy or blameable . . . depends on some internal sense or feeling which 
nature has made universal in the whole species” ([1777] 1975, 172–173).2
Contemporary neosentimentalists link moral judgment inextricably to appropriate 
moral feelings, primarily empathy, and the agent’s ability to discern the appropriate moral 
feeling and act in accordance with that feeling in the absence of said feeling (D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2000, 729).3 Moral sentimentalism has many varieties, but, for my purposes, I 
focus on one recent novel version, Shaun Nichols’ “sentimental rules” account. I focus on 
this account because of its power to shed explanatory light on the films and de Waal’s 
particular brand of sentimentalism.
The main advantage of Nichols’ sentimental rules account is that it explains what 
he calls “core moral judgment.” Core moral judgment has two main components: “a 
normative theory prohibiting harming others, and some affective mechanism that is 
activated by suffering in others” (Nichols 2004, 18). At its root, core moral judgment is 
the ability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules. Moral and conventional 
rules have in common that they are rules. To elaborate, they are normative principles that 
govern conduct and are abstract insofar as they apply to any agent that would perform a 
certain kind of behavior, even when variables may change.
For instance, consider the rule against a student talking in a classroom without first 
raising her hand. The rule applies to all students, in a wide variety a situations within 
the classroom. Therefore, understanding the rule requires the ability, given a classroom 
setting, to abstract and generalize from the situation. However, important differences 
hold between moral and conventional rules. Certain categories of inappropriate actions, 
such as hitting or pulling hair, seem different from other categories of inappropriate 
2. Cited in D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 722.
3. In more technical terms, D’Arms and Jacobson refer to the heart of neosentimentalism as the “Response 
Dependency Thesis:” “to think that X has some evaluative property ϕ is to think it appropriate to feel F in 
response to X.”
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actions, such as talking over everyone in the room or slurping one’s soup. The first 
category contains morally impermissable actions, while the latter contains conventionally 
impermissible actions. Nichols surveys psychological experiments (including some of 
his own) that indicate that young children can make this distinction, but psychopaths 
cannot. The reason for this difference is that young children respond affectively to the 
suffering caused by pulling hair, but psychopaths do not. As Nichols’ puts the point, 
“children respond with distress and concern to another’s suffering. These responses 
seem to be diminished in psychopaths” (Nichols 2004, 17). Nichols cites Blair’s research, 
which finds that even nonpsychopathic criminals make a significant moral/conventional 
distinction, whereas psychopaths do not (Blair 1995, 1–27).4 When asked why one 
should not pull someone’s hair, young children will say something like “because it will 
hurt them,” whereas psychopaths will say something like “because it’s not allowed” 
(Nichols 2004, 19).
Therefore, core moral judgment premises a distinction between moral and 
conventional rules. This distinction is rooted in an affective response to the suffering 
an action causes another person, and even young children can make this distinction. 
Furthermore, people with core moral judgment attribute other characteristics to moral 
rules they do not attribute to conventional rules. In particular, an action that violates a 
moral rule usually ranks higher on a scale measuring the seriousness of the violation, 
the generalizability of the violation (it is wrong in all cultures, not just the subject’s 
own culture), and the independence of the violation from the presence of an authority 
(Nichols 2004, 22).
All these attributes tend to apply to actions that harm another person. The 
connection between the 1) affect and 2) seriousness, generalizability, and authority-
independence combine to produce the distinction between moral and conventional rules. 
This distinction rests on whether or not the action involves an affective response. To 
break conventional rules does not normally activate the agent’s affective mechanism. 
Thus, people see those deeds as wrong only because an authority disallows the action. 
However, actions that harm another person activate the agent’s affective mechanism, 
and it seems that actions that cause harm and activate the affective mechanism closely 
tie to universal harm norms for most (nonpsychotic) agents.5 
4. Cited in Nichols 2004, 12.
5. Even psychopaths have a normative theory prohibiting hitting for instance, but, as previously stated, they 
offer conventional justifications for their moral violations. The main difference between the psychopath 
and the nonpsychopath seems to be the activation of affect in response to another’s suffering. It should be 
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To sum up, Nichols’ sentimental rules account posits that core moral judgment entails 
the ability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules. Moral rules activate 
the agent’s affective mechanism, so the agent sees the rules as serious, generalizable, 
and independent of authority. The final, crucial point is that “the affective mechanism 
responsive to suffering in others, in conjunction with information about harm norms, 
produces the nonconventional theory” that guides moral judgment (Nichols 2004, 27). 
So, the agent must have both an affective mechanism responsive to suffering in others 
and the ability to understand and apply abstract norms regarding harm. One should keep 
in mind the two main aspects of Nichols’ sentimental rules account as examination turns 
to the movies and de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism.
Section Two: The Evolution of the Moral Community in The Planet of the Apes 
Reboots
The overall narrative arc of the recent Planet of the Apes movies shows the 
development of the great apes into a human-like community where the members have 
human-like capacities for language, thought, and culture. The 2011 Rise of the Planet of 
the Apes tells the story of how the first chimp develops those human-like capacities and 
shares them with other great apes. In Rise, a common chimp develops human intelligence 
through exposure to an experimental Alzheimer’s drug in utero, purported to stimulate 
neurogenesis, or the growth of new brain cells. The baby chimp is able to hold his own 
bottle at just a few days old, solves complex puzzles, tests at human IQ levels, rapidly 
picks up sign language, and adapts to life in a human home. The people caring for him 
name him Caesar.
In addition to improved motor skills and cognition, Caesar exhibits reflective 
consciousness and emotional intelligence sometimes thought of as exclusively human. 
While walking in the park with his adoptive father, Will Rodman, Caesar notices a dog on 
a leash. Caesar is also on a leash, and, after responding to the barking dog with a primal 
growl that reduces the poor canine to a whimper, Caesar signs to his father, “Am I a pet?” 
When his father replies, “No, you’re not a pet,” Caesar signs, “What is Caesar?” (Wyatt 
2011). This moment of self-recognition reflects our more advanced understanding 
(compared to when the original film was made) of self-recognition in primates.6 We now 
know that all great apes (except gorillas) and a few other animals recognize themselves in 
noted that Nichols is not entirely clear on how he thinks these two elements are connected.
6. For instance, see Povinelli et al. 1993, 347–372.
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mirrors. Such recognition suggests that great apes understand themselves as individuals 
and potentially can distinguish their own mental states from the mental states of other 
great apes. 
In a later scene, for example, Caesar witnesses an angry neighbor accost his human 
“grandfather,” Charles Rodman, who suffers from Alzheimer’s and has mistakenly entered, 
and damaged, the neighbor’s car. Caesar perceives one of his caretakers to be in danger, 
cannot control his anger, and brutally, relentlessly attacks the neighbor in retaliation.7 The 
assault leads to Caesar’s confinement in a primate shelter. Caesar’s human-like cognitive 
traits continue to develop. At first overpowered and bullied by the other apes, Caesar 
devises a plan to build a primate community with himself as the leader. He releases a 
large gorilla named Buck, who is kept in solitary confinement. Through this deed, Caesar 
gains Buck’s trust and uses the gorilla’s size to overpower, and thereby gain dominance 
over, the shelter’s antagonistic Alpha male. 
Caesar later gives the “Alpha” male a cookie, lets him out of his cage, and appoints 
him to distribute cookies to the others. To build community, Caesar then lets all the apes 
out of their cages and introduces them to a principle that will become one of the ape 
mottos: “ape together stronger.” Caesar breaks free from containment and returns to his 
human home. Once there, he steals from the refrigerator the drug that has caused his 
extraordinary development. He then returns to the primate shelter and releases the drug, 
which exists as a gas, spreading it in a cloud to all the inhabitants. When they awaken the 
next morning, they too have increased cognitive capacities. Caesar then leads the apes in 
an escape from the primate center, through the trees of San Francisco, across the Golden 
Gate Bridge, and into the redwoods. 
The second reboot, released in 2014 and titled Dawn of the Planet of the Apes, 
begins by showing the peaceful colony of apes Caesar and the others have founded. In 
the colony, the apes teach their children sign language, a written alphabet, and several 
abstract moral principles. For example, the apes live by the motto “ape not kill ape,” 
an abstract, general moral principle that “unenhanced” apes cannot comprehend and 
therefore do not hold.
The end of the first movie and the beginning of the second also explain how the 
human race begins its devolution. The experimental drug that enhances nonhuman 
7. It is important to note that Caesar refrains from killing the man of his own accord. We know based on 
Chimp behavior in the wild as well as recent accounts of human raised chimps—such as the event with 
Travis in 2009—that many chimps Caesar’s age would kill the man. For more information on Travis, see the 
following commentaries: de Waal 2009a and de Waal 2009b.
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primate intelligence is deadly to humans. The drug infects a lab worker named Robert 
Franklin, who, while trying to let Will Rodman know he is ill, then inadvertently infects 
the same neighbor Caesar attacked. The infected neighbor is a pilot. The final scene of the 
first film shows the pilot going to the airport, boarding a flight, and rapidly spreading the 
virus across the globe. 
The beginning of Dawn reveals the horrific loss of life that resulted from the “Simian 
flu.”8 Only 1 in every 500 humans, genetically immune to the virus, were spared its 
deadly effects. One group of human survivors has built a community in San Francisco, 
but the community is running out of power. So a small group travels into the redwoods, 
hoping to repair a dam that can provide their community with electricity. The humans 
and apes forge a fragile peace, but that peace breaks down after misunderstandings and 
betrayals of trust from apes and humans alike. By the end of Dawn, a war has begun 
between apes and humans.
Section Three: De Waal on Primate Social Behavior and the Building Blocks of 
Human Morality 
Having briefly described the evolution of morality in the reboots, I now discuss 
recent research in primatology to illuminate the films. Fascinating about the reboots are 
the specific ways they reflect recent research in primatology and related fields, particularly 
the research of renowned primatologist Frans de Waal. In this section, I describe empathy 
and normativity, the two main poles of de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism 
(EMS), and point out scenes in the reboots that reinforce key conclusions of his research. 
De Waal is perhaps the foremost proponent of the continuity between primates 
and humans. In particular, he argues that nonhuman primate social behavior evidences 
the building blocks of human morality. De Waal argues that all the great primates 
(human and nonhuman) are fundamentally social, that feelings of empathy are at work 
in nonhuman primates, and therefore that both humans and primates are caring and 
violent, selfish and nurturing. Since de Waal goes to great lengths to argue that morality 
slowly has developed over the long span of human evolution, I refer to his account as an 
“evolutionary moral sentimentalism.” 
De Waal is a self-avowed moral sentimentalist. According to de Waal, moral 
sentimentalism “firmly anchors morality in the natural inclinations and desires of our 
8. This is not too far-fetched since the immune system of a Chimpanzee is much more robust than a human’s 
immune system. That is why chimps are tragically the subjects are many medical experiments, often 
infecting them with diseases such as Hepatitis. 
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species” and emphasizes the role of the emotions in human morality (2006, 18). One of 
the primary philosophical advantages of sentimentalism generally is that sentimentalism 
provides a naturalistic account of moral emotions, reasoning, and judgment. By 
naturalistic account, I simply mean that sentimentalist accounts refer to nothing outside 
of the natural world (i.e. God or the soul), and look to evidence in the natural and human 
sciences to validate their position.9 De Waal goes a step further by telling a story about 
how the roots of morality arise from nonhuman primate behavior. 
The foundation of de Waal’s argument for the continuity of primate behavior and 
human morality is his claim that human beings are “social to the core,” a core largely 
shared with primates such as chimpanzees and bonobos (2006, 5). This shared social 
core generates the capacities for cooperation, reciprocity, fairness, self-control, and 
more. Crucial for this paper’s argument, the social nature is the source of the two basic 
building blocks of the moral life: the capacity for reactive attitudes such as empathy and 
sympathy, and the capacity for “adherence to an ideal or standard” or what de Waal calls 
“natural normativity” (2014, 187). I briefly cover each of these in turn. 
One of the key aspects of de Waal’s EMS is the claim that morality is rooted in 
certain kinds of reactive attitudes, particularly the propensity to have the feeling of 
another agent involuntarily aroused in one’s self. More specifically, de Waal stresses the 
importance of empathy for the moral life, or the ability deliberately to adopt the point of 
view of other agents, to see and feel things from their perspective (2006, 39). De Waal 
says that empathy “covers a wide-range of emotional linkage patterns, from the very 
simple and automatic to the highly sophisticated” (2006, 41). The very simple and the 
highly sophisticated both are observed in primates and are an essential part of human 
morality. 
De Waal calls the most sophisticated form of empathy “attribution,” or fully 
adopting another’s perspective, referred to as theory of mind (or sometimes simply 
“mindreading”). To adopt that perspective, the agent must not only have the ability to 
look for reasons for the other’s emotions, but also be able to understand the other agent’s 
mental states, what the other believes, desires, and so forth. De Waal (2006, 26) more 
succinctly defines sympathy as follows: “an affective response that consists of feelings of 
sorrow or concern for a distressed or needy other (rather than the same emotion as the 
other person).” So, empathy is recognizing and feeling what the other agent is feeling, 
while sympathy is recognizing what the other is feeling, and feeling concern or distress 
9. A more technical definition is that ethical naturalism is the view that ethical or moral facts reduce to other 
natural facts, where a natural fact is something that is the subject matter of the natural sciences.
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for the other. Empathy requires mindreading; sympathy does not.10 But empathy and 
sympathy both have a vital element in common: they are reactive attitudes—responses 
to suffering or distress in another agent—and are motivating mental states. 
One of de Waal’s favorite examples of primate empathy is the chimp Kuni, who tried 
to help a bird fly by climbing to the top of the highest tree in the enclosure, wrapping 
her feet around the tree branch to leave her hands free, and then spreading out the 
bird’s wings and launching the bird into flight (2006, 31). Kuni seemingly understood the 
difference between a chimp’s needs and the needs of a bird, and responded appropriately. 
She could read the bird’s “mind” and responded to its suffering. De Waal cites a number 
of similar examples that he takes as sufficient proof that primates can adopt another’s 
viewpoint. Chimps respond to the pain they see in another chimp; a chimp helped 
another chimp who had fallen into a moat; chimps will protect comrades who are being 
attacked. All those responses require a basic understanding of the other’s situation and 
emotional cues, and the ability purposefully to respond.
Biologists see in the reactive attitudes of empathy what they call “reciprocal 
altruism.” De Waal defines reciprocal altruism as exchanged acts that are costly to the 
performer but beneficial to the recipient (2006, 13). Biologists believe such attitudes 
have evolved because “[e]volution favors animals that assist each other if by doing so 
they achieve long-term benefits of greater value than the benefits derived from going 
it alone and competing with others” (13). This is counterintuitive to our common-sense 
understanding of altruism: altruistic acts are precisely acts that bring no benefit to 
the agent. Yet, biologists refer to reciprocal altruism as altruism because any form of 
assistance toward another creature that costs the agent something and does not bring 
immediate positive results to the agent seems to run counter to one of the basic precepts 
of Darwinian evolution: natural selection (Sober and Wilson 1998, 25). Nevertheless, 
it is easier to see how tendencies to perform actions that will be reciprocated would be 
evolutionarily beneficial. It is more difficult to see how altruistic acts evolved that do not 
benefit the agent. 
One sees many examples of unreciprocated altruism, from lowly parasites to the 
great apes. For example, the trematode parasite Dicrocoelium dendriticum spends the 
adult stages of its life cycle in the liver of cows and sheep, but, during the long process 
that it takes for the eggs to get from feces back to the liver, it spends its time in an ant. 
Of the fifty parasites that enter the ant, one migrates to the brain of the ant where it 
10. As addressed below, autistic children demonstrate the capacity for basic moral judgment and sympathy, 
but generally do not appear to have the capacity for empathy. 
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modifies the ant’s behavior, causing the ant to spend more time on the tips of grass 
blades, where the ant is more likely to be eaten by a sheep or cow. The brain worm then 
dies, while the others go on to live as adult parasites in the host (Sober and Wilson 1998, 
18). Despite the lack of intentionality of any mental states on the part of the parasite, 
the behavior certainly looks altruistic since the brain worm dies for the sake of its parasite 
comrades. 
De Waal cites an example with apparent intentionality. A chimp named Krom notices 
that his aunt Jackie is trying to get water out of a large tire suspended from a pipe. The 
tire is pinned behind several other tires and thus Jackie cannot withdraw any water. After 
Jackie gives up, Krom begins to remove the tires one by one until he gets to the tire 
with water in it. He carefully removes it without spilling any water and carries the tire 
to Jackie. Jackie drinks her water, and Krom walks away without any display from either 
party. Two points are relevant. First, as in the Kuni story, Krom reads Jackie’s mind and 
responds appropriately. Second, Krom receives no benefits for his actions; the altruism 
has no apparent reciprocity.
There are a number of interesting examples of reactive attitudes and reciprocal 
altruism in the Planet of the Apes reboots. Recall the earlier example from Rise. Caesar’s 
human grandfather, suffering from Alzheimer’s, mistakenly wrecks a neighbor’s car, and 
the neighbor confronts him. Caesar is aware of his grandfather’s condition. In an earlier 
scene, for example, he helps the old man use the correct end of his fork to eat eggs. Thus, 
when Caesar sees his grandfather being attacked, he leaps into action to protect him.
In Dawn, Caesar responds to the suffering of another agent, that of his wife, who 
gets sick after childbirth (he starts a family in the chimp colony, in the interim between 
the events of the two movies). However, one of the most moving examples is how he 
responds to the small band of human survivors that need access to a dam located within 
the territory of the ape colony. He agrees to help them despite protest from his fellow 
apes, including Koba, who points to scars on his body as evidence of mistreatment in the 
Gyn Sys laboratory, exclaiming “Human work!” 
Caesar’s experience with humans has been largely positive because of his primary 
caretakers. Indeed, in one scene, he refers to his human “father” as “a good man.” 
Moreover, Caesar can see that the band of humans is desperate. Thus, he allows them 
access to the hydroelectric plant and even instructs apes to assist with the work. This 
assistance is not a cold, calculated move made in the interest of the ape community. 
Rather, it shows Caesar responding to the needs of others. It exemplifies recognition of 
other people’s needs, a sense of their desperation, and a compassionate response.
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However, the best example of positive reactive attitudes, of reciprocal altruism, 
happens at the end of Rise. As the apes are attempting to escape across the Golden Gate 
Bridge and into the redwood forest, a police helicopter opens fire on Caesar, believing 
that if they take out the leader, they can stop the revolt. Buck, the large gorilla Caesar 
had released from solitary confinement in the primate shelter, pushes Caesar out of the 
way of gunfire, takes the gunfire on himself, and, leaping into the helicopter, sacrifices 
his life to take down the assailants. While this act returns Caesar’s kindness, it goes far 
beyond the original act. Buck gets nothing in return for giving his life for the sake of a 
friend. 
Reactive attitudes such as empathy and sympathy constitute one of the basic 
building blocks of human morality, and de Waal has long emphasized their importance. 
More recently, he has begun to emphasize normativity as well. In doing so, de Waal 
responds to frequent criticism from philosophers that the reactive attitudes of animals 
are not intentional; rather, animals are wantons, creatures that follow whichever desire is 
strongest.11 For instance, one may argue that evolution has hardwired reciprocal altruism 
into the great apes because helping conspecifics brings potential future benefits to the 
agent, thus increasing the agent’s chances of survival. But simply acting in accord with 
one’s strongest impulse is not moral; morality often requires conformity to a standard 
even when a desire conflicts with that standard. De Waal responds to this criticism 
by arguing that many animals conform to norms, often in ways that resemble human 
moral action. He argues that, at the most basic level, we see normativity in animal 
behavior when spiders repair webs or ants repair the nest (de Waal 2014, 187). But 
this normativity is reflected in much more important ways, such as in instances of fair 
distribution of rewards, acts of self-control, and reconciliation. I briefly review these 
examples. 
Many studies have suggested that some animals respond negatively to the unjust 
distribution of rewards or goods. For example, in a now-infamous experiment, de Waal 
and colleague Brosnan had two capuchin monkeys perform a simple task for a reward. 
The first monkey performed the task, received a cucumber slice, and appeared satisfied 
with the reward. The second monkey performed the same task, but received a grape as 
his reward. The first monkey performed the task again, but, when he was again given 
a cucumber slice, he revolted, throwing the slice at the experimenter. This first monkey 
11. Both Kitcher and Korsgaard use this term—made popular in the philosophical literature by Harry Frankfurt 
(1971, 5–20) in his essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”—in their respective responses 
to de Waal in Primates and Philosophers.
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protested each time, since his partner continued to get grapes for the same work while 
he got cucumbers (Brosnan and de Waal 2003, 297–299).12
De Waal (2014, 195) calls this “inequity aversion” (IA). The reaction is even stronger 
when the experiment couples one agent’s reward with the punishment of a conspecific. 
In another famous study, rhesus monkeys could receive food by pulling on a lever, but 
doing so delivered shocks to a conspecific. The experimenters found that many monkeys 
would refuse to perform this task. The aversion was so great that one monkey refused to 
eat for five days, while another refused to eat for twelve days (Masserman et al. 1964, 
584–585).13 The monkey’s sense of fair distribution of goods coupled with the reactive 
attitudes in response to the pain and suffering of conspecifics proved a great motivator.
De Waal rightly notes that the capuchin monkey experiment exemplifies 
disadvantageous IA. The agent negatively responds to the unjust distribution of goods 
that is disadvantageous to the agent. A higher level of fairness is advantageous IA: the 
aversion to the unequal distribution of goods that favors the agent. This appears to be 
a more uniquely human capacity. However, recent experiments have tested chimps in a 
version of the ultimatum game and appear to lend some evidence in favor of primate 
advantageous IA. In the now-classic experiment, a human subject (the proposer) is given 
a sum of money, for example, 10 dollars. The subject has a partner (the respondent) who 
knows how much money the subject received. The proposer gets to choose how much 
money she can keep and how much to give to the respondent. The motivator is that if 
the respondent accepts the offer, then both participants keep their share. However, if the 
respondent rejects the offer, then neither participant gets to keep any money.
People in Western cultures typically offer around 50% of the available amount as 
do people in most other cultures (Guth 1995, 329–344; Camerer and Loewenstein 2004, 
3–52; Henrich et al. 2001, 73–78).14 Surprisingly, in a simplified version of the ultimatum 
game designed for chimps and 3-to 5-year-old children, chimps tended to opt for an 
equal distribution instead of an unequal one (Proctor et al. 2013, 2070–2075).15 De Waal 
takes this to suggest that chimps are also sensitive to unequal distributions of goods 
that favor the agent. However, neither chimps nor children distributed the goods equally 
in the absence of partner influence, suggesting a lack of autonomous moral agency. 
12. Cited in de Waal 2014, 195.
13. Cited in de Waal 2006, 29.
14. Cited in de Waal 2014, 197.
15. Cited in de Waal 2014, 197.
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Nevertheless, taken together, these studies suggest that nonhuman primates are sensitive 
to unequal distribution of goods, respond negatively, and take action to attempt to 
rectify the situation by bringing it back in line with a norm of fair distribution.
Recall the time in Rise when Caesar appoints the former “Alpha” male, Rocket, 
to distribute cookies to all the apes. Caesar begins by giving a cookie to Rocket, then 
instructs him to give one cookie to each ape until the cookies run out. Caesar could have 
easily kept all the cookies for himself, or handed them out preferentially. Instead, Caesar 
seems to recognize the importance of fair distribution for community building.16 
Fair distribution is one way that nonhuman primates seem to conform to norms. A 
second way is self-control, particularly impulse control. One of the main charges against 
primate moral instincts by philosophers is that primates are wantons—creatures that 
always follow their strongest desire. Documenting impulse control would go a long way 
toward demonstrating that nonhuman primates can check their stronger impulses for 
an alternative though less strong desire. In what follows I describe several experiments 
suggesting that nonhuman primates have this ability. 
In another now-classic experiment, children are given a marshmallow and are 
promised that they will get another marshmallow if they can refrain from eating the 
first. Children can hold out for several minutes, but so can monkeys and chimps (Mischel, 
Ebbesen, and Raskoff Zeiss 1972, 204–218; Logue 1988, 665–709; Beran et al. 1999, 
119–127; Amici, Aureli, and Call 2008, 1415–1419).17 As interesting as they are, these 
experiments demonstrate only the ability for participants to delay gratification for a short 
time to get a greater amount of the same gratification. 
Other studies involving intentional self-distraction are more illuminating. For 
instance, Evans and Beran put a spin on the delayed gratification experiment: they 
offered chimps toys to play with while the chimps were offered a treat to see if the 
chimps would distract themselves. Again, the chimps knew that, if they refrained from 
eating the treat, they would get a greater reward. The chimps played with the toys 
and ignored the treat, allowing them to delay gratification for up to 18 minutes. As a 
control, the experimenters ran the experiment with the reward outside the enclosure, 
out of the reach of the chimp, so there was no temptation to consume the treat before 
it had accumulated (Evans and Beran 2007, 599–602). In this instance, the chimps did 
16. My thanks to Les Ballard for pointing this example out to me. 
17. For the experiments with children, see Mischel, Ebbesen, and Raskoff Zeiss 1972, 204–218; and Logue 
1988, 665–709. For experiments with chimps and monkeys, see Beran et al. 1999, 119–127; and Amici, 
Aureli, and Call 2008, 1415–1419. Cited in de Waal 2014, 189.
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not bother playing with the toys, indicating they had intentionally played with the toys 
in the previous experiment to distract themselves from the reward. Although this is still 
simply an instance of delaying gratification for a time in favor of greater gratification 
in the future, this shows that primates can intentionally distract themselves, one of the 
most basic instances of human self-control and emotion regulation and a necessary skill 
for deliberation and future planning.18
Nonhuman primates demonstrate impulse control when presented with greater 
positive outcomes, but they also can control their impulses when faced with negative 
outcomes. When several chimps all want to mate with the same female, often they 
sit around for hours grooming each other and calming themselves down rather than 
engage in a vicious battle for her. No one approaches the female until each male is 
sufficiently calm, and this behavior wards off a violent altercation (de Waal 2014, 
194–195). Chimps do likewise when they are expecting food, which often can cause an 
altercation. Ostensibly warding off a fight, they will groom each other and engage in 
celebrations (195). These crucial examples show instances of impulse control when faced 
with the possibility of a negative outcome. Furthermore, the impulse is being controlled 
not simply for the sake of greater future gratification, but to avoid painful conflict and 
maintain communal harmony. 
When a member of the human colony approaches Caesar and asks to be allowed to 
repair a dam that can provide the human colony with unlimited power, Caesar takes a 
night to deliberate. Most of the apes want to attack the human colony. Koba—Caesar’s 
close confidant—fears that electricity will give the humans more power, making them 
more of a threat to the apes, and insists that the apes do not help the humans. Caesar is 
partially afraid that if he does not help the humans, they will attack. After Koba responds, 
“Let them attack,” Maurice—another confidant—points out they do not know how 
many humans there are, or how many guns they have. That uncertainty does not change 
Koba’s mind. However, Caesar wants above all to prevent a war because he knows that 
war risks all they have built: home, family, and future. Koba cannot control his impulses, 
but Caesar can. Because of his impulse control, Caesar is able to engage in future planning 
and goal-oriented deliberation. 
18. There is a large and growing body of literature documenting the human capacity for emotion regulation 
and its relationship to the agent’s overall welfare. For recent studies, see Feinberg et al. 2012, 788–95; 
and Lai, Haidt, and Nosek 2014, 781–794. For broader overviews, see John and Gross 2004, 1301–33; and 
Beauregard 2007, 218–236.
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The final example of conformity to norms to highlight is reconciliation. De Waal 
notes, “about thirty different primate species reconcile after fights, and that reconciliation 
is not limited to the primates. There is evidence for this mechanism in hyenas, dolphins, 
wolves, domestic goats, and so on” (2014, 192). After a conflict, chimps will groom 
and kiss each other, while bonobos will engage in sexual contact. Reconciliation often 
is seen in preventative form as well. For instance, when young chimps engage in playful 
wrestling bouts, a mother steps in and stops the bout at the first sign of distress. Her 
mediation keeps a conflict from breaking out. Some of the above examples on impulse 
control are also about conflict prevention.
Conflict resolution is another example of nonhuman primates curbing certain 
behavioral tendencies that would negatively affect the community. If conflicts can be 
peacefully resolved (or better yet prevented from occurring), then a certain standard of 
communal harmony can be maintained. The reboots also highlight conflict resolution. In 
one of the more powerful scenes in Dawn, Koba enters into the dam to find humans and 
apes working together to repair it. Recall that the Gyn Sys lab experimented on Koba, 
and he has many scars on his body that he refers to as “human work.” Appalled that the 
apes are helping the humans, he demands to see Caesar. As he is looking for Caesar, Koba 
pushes a human teenager to the ground. He cannot control his impulse to do violence.
When Caesar emerges, Koba asks why Caesar insists on helping the humans, declares 
that Caesar loves humans more than apes—loves humans even more than his own son. 
Caesar erupts in anger at this comment, and the two start to fight. Caesar gains the 
upper hand and nearly strangles Koba to death; but Caesar stops short, pronouncing 
between pursed lips, “ape not kill ape.” Koba stands up, assumes a bowing posture of 
submission, extends his hand, and asks for Caesar’s forgiveness in front of many other 
apes. After briefly considering Koba’s gesture, Caesar extends his hand, thus accepting 
the act of reconciliation. Caesar is able to return to himself from a violent immediacy, 
apply the ape motto, abstract from the situation to prefer the universal of forgiveness 
over the particularity of violence, and reconcile with Koba. Although the reconciliation 
is short lived, it highlights the primate capacity for reflection and abstract reasoning, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation. Even primates do not want to live in a constant state of 
violent upheaval, so they have developed tendencies and practices that help maintain 
communal harmony.
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Section Four: The Impartiality of Moral Judgment
Thus far I have highlighted two main aspects of de Waal’s EMS—reactive attitudes 
and normativity—and documented how the recent Planet of the Apes films imaginatively 
portray these aspects. I also have described a recent version of moral sentimentalism, 
Nichols’ sentimental rules account. A clear connection exists between Nichols and de 
Waal’s versions of moral sentimentalism. The heart of Nichols’ account is the capacity for 
core moral judgment, or the ability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules. 
The capacity for core moral judgments rests on the marriage of an affective mechanism 
with the understanding of abstract norms regarding harm. De Waal has argued that 
nonhuman primates have the ability for reactive attitudes, particularly in response to the 
needs of suffering of others, and that nonhuman primates can adjust their behavior given 
certain goals or communal behavioral standards.
At first glance, the connection between de Waal’s EMS and Nichols’ sentimental rules 
account appears to strengthen de Waal’s case for the continuity between primate social 
behavior and human morality. However, on closer investigation, it becomes clear that to 
understand and apply abstract moral rules, an ape must “possess the representational 
processes necessary for systematically reinterpreting first-order perceptual relations 
in terms of higher-order, role-governed relational structures. . .,” what Povinelli and 
colleagues refer to as the “relational reinterpretation hypothesis” (Penn, Holyoak, and 
Povinelli 2008, 111). In other words, the application of moral norms requires the ability 
to abstract oneself from one’s particular position and consider how a general principle—
the common underlying explanation—may apply to any person in a different situation 
that has certain features in common—yet is perceptually disparate—from the current 
situation. 
For instance, in experiments 9–14 described in Povinelli and Ballew’s (2012, 138) 
World without Weight: Perspectives on an Alien Mind, a group of chimpanzees are 
presented with various weight sorting tasks. In experiment 9, the chimps are trained 
to sort the objects based on weight, and put the object in one bin if it is heavy and in 
the other bin if it is light (it should be noted that the difference in weight is typically 
10-fold). If they get it right on the first try, they get a treat. No chimp tested could 
learn to do this in fewer than 400 trials, while some took up to 1562 trials, with a mean 
of 895 trials (97). Experiments 19–23 measured the impact of weight. In one variation, 
the chimps had to choose one of two balls and roll it down an incline. Only the heavy 
ball would push an apple through a hinged door toward the bottom of the incline. If 
the chimp chooses correctly, then she gets the apple. Again, this takes hundreds of trials 
for the chimp to learn. In both of these studies (as well as in many others conducted by 
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Povinelli and his team), the chimps’ ability to sort based on weight drops to mere chance 
(186). Alternatively, experiment 30 tested the ability of 3–5 year old human children to 
sort and understand the impact of weight, and found that nearly 100% performed the 
tasks correctly. In fact, children often pass it on the first try “without assistance from the 
main experimenter” (255). Children demonstrate the ability to understand an abstract 
concept such as weight that chimps apparently lack. 
From these and other experiments, Povinelli concludes that chimps do not 
understand the concept of weight, which requires the ability to “reinterpret observable 
objects and relationships in terms of unobservable variables” (2012, 26). A clear 
connection exists between concepts such as weight, and moral principles. Based on the 
growing evidence that nonhuman primates are incapable of this kind of abstract thinking, 
the kind of moral reasoning and action creatively depicted in the recent Planet of the 
Apes films is indeed imaginary. While conflict resolution among nonhuman primates is 
well documented, Caesar’s motivation for restraining from killing Koba in the dam scene 
is based on his commitment to an abstract moral principle that an ape cannot hold due to 
its generalizability. Furthermore, although we know that nonhuman primates can delay 
gratification, delaying gratification in favor of long-term goals such as the good of the 
ape community and its progeny clearly outstrip ape intellectual capabilities.
To be fair, de Waal never claims that nonhuman primates are capable of human 
morality. Nevertheless, it often seems that he wants to hide this fact. However, de Waal 
hints at his understanding of human morality, claiming that human morality differs 
only quantitatively from primate social behavior. In other words, de Waal’s evolutionary 
moral sentimentalism posits a “total gradualism” between primate social behavior and 
human morality.19 However, de Waal’s own understanding of the distinctiveness of 
human morality coupled with our growing knowledge of primate intellectual capacities 
highlights a gap between primate social behavior and human morality. This gap is 
highly problematic for de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism, because de Waal 
argues that human morality evolves from primate social behavior, but he cannot provide 
an evolutionary story to explain how the second major prong of his own theory—
normativity—evolved. To understand the nature of this gap between primate social 
behavior and human morality, it is useful to consider de Waal’s own understanding of 
the human moral sense.
When discussing his understanding of the evolution of human morality, de Waal 
often quotes Darwin: “Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, 
19. This is Christine Korsgaard’s (Korsgaard 2006, 104) term.
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the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral 
sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or 
nearly as well developed, as in man” (Darwin [1871] 1981, 71–72; quoted in de Waal 
2006, 14). De Waal makes mostly clear what the social instincts are and how they can 
develop into more complex mental states. However, the nature of this human moral sense 
requires illumination. De Waal’s discussion of the late-nineteenth-century philosopher 
and sociologist, Edward Westermarck, lends clarity. De Waal endorses Westermarck’s 
distinction between reciprocal attitudes and moral emotions. Whereas reciprocal 
attitudes such as “gratitude and resentment directly concern one’s interests,” moral 
emotions are marked by their “disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and flavour of 
generality” (Westermarck 1906, 738–739).20 
The impartial, disinterested nature of the moral emotions may seem to put them 
at odds with the core of reciprocal attitudes, attitudes that require the basic ability 
to recognize suffering in another agent and have sympathy for that agent. Here de 
Waal’s nod to moral philosopher and economist Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator” is 
helpful. Smith (along with his friend David Hume) believes that human beings have 
the unique ability to expand local dispositions of kindness, sympathy, and reciprocity 
directed originally toward children, kin, and perhaps other members of one’s in-group. 
The truly moral emotions or sympathies, however, “should be moved by what is ‘useful 
and agreeable’ to people (in general),” even when that general good conflicts with selfish 
or local interests (Kitcher 2006, 132). On a Smithian account, this transition involves 
reflecting on or mirroring the various judgments and perspectives and combining them 
into a genuine moral sentiment (133). 
Smith famously stated, “We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we 
imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it” ([1759] 1982, 204). 
This “impartial spectator” is the inner moral faculty by which we judge ourselves. 
Furthermore, “it is the peculiar office of those (moral) faculties . . . to judge, to bestow 
censure or applause on all the other principles of our nature” (273–274).21 De Waal refers 
explicitly to Smith’s notion of the “impartial spectator” and states that in this area of 
disinterestedness human emotions “seem to go radically further than other primates’ 
[emotions]” (de Waal 2006, 20). Smithian moral approval requires distancing ourselves 
from our personal standpoints to obtain an impartial view of our own motives. Therefore, 
20. Cited in de Waal 2006, 20.
21. Cited in Kauppinen 2014.
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de Waal seems to endorse an account of human morality at the same time beyond the 
reach of primate cognitive capacity, yet rooted in basic features of primate social behavior.
De Waal’s recent attempt to provide an account of “natural normativity,” or the ways 
that nonhuman primates bring their behavior in line with certain standards, connects 
to one of the most fascinating, difficult aspects of Smith and Westermarck’s moral 
sentimentalist account. This aspect is also especially relevant to the films. On Smith’s 
account, the “impartial” nature of moral judgment begs the question: Since one agent 
cannot possibly know or take into account every other agent’s perspective, how does the 
spectator arrive at her impartial judgment? Smith offers a hint when he notes that most 
of our moral judgments are based on general rules, which are themselves rooted in our 
emotional responses to particular cases (Kauppinen 2014, 16; Smith [1759] 1982, 387). 
Similarly, Westermarck (1906, 4) notes, “To name an act good or bad, ultimately implies 
that it is apt to give rise to an emotion of approval or disapproval in him who pronounces 
the judgment . . .” Furthermore, the agent makes the judgment on the account of an 
“accepted general rule” based on an “emotional sanction in his own mind” (6).22
Although it is not entirely clear how these general rules and emotional responses 
are connected, here is one way to understand the preceding comments. Imagine that 
an agent witnesses a morally salient action—an act of fraud against a conspecific, for 
instance—but that this action does not directly concern the witness. The witness is in 
a hurry and is not affected by the incident: he does not feel particularly bad for the 
victim nor does he know her. In fact, the witness may never see the victim again. But he 
believes it is wrong to deceive another person, and one of the main reasons he believes 
that is wrong is the pain that he feels when someone else deceives him. Therefore, even 
though he does not actually feel sympathy at the moment, he is motivated to help 
the victim because of a general principle he is committed to, namely, that “it is wrong 
to intentionally deceive another person.” That principle derives from his own reactive 
attitudes toward those who deceived him in the past. Furthermore, he believes that most 
other people are also hurt when they are intentionally deceived. In this way, abstract 
rules or principles derive from, and connect to, common emotional responses, even when 
those emotions are not active in the agent performing the moral judgment. 
This discussion of the impartial nature of moral judgment is meant to highlight 
both an advantage and a disadvantage of de Waal’s EMS. De Waal’s recent attempt 
to demonstrate that many nonhuman primates adjust their behavior because of norms 
suggests they may be capable of impartial moral judgment. They appear to recognize 
22. Cited in Kauppinen 2014.
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suffering in others and often act to alleviate that suffering. They work to prevent harmful 
conflicts from arising that would negatively affect the community. They control their 
impulses not only to realize more advantageous personal outcomes, but also to maintain 
communal harmony. Taken together, these points enhance our understanding of the roots 
of human morality in primate behavior; however, the moral behaviors still fall short of 
anything resembling impartial moral judgment. De Waal himself notes this point, not 
only when he admits that disinterested moral emotions go far beyond the reciprocal 
attitudes of primates, but also when he discusses natural normativity. When comparing 
his understanding of natural normativity with impartial moral judgment, he states:
Differences likely remain, however. Other primates do not seem 
to extend norms beyond their immediate social environment, and 
appear unworried about social relationships or situations that they 
do not directly participate in... One could argue that their behavior is 
normative in that it seeks certain outcomes, but that animals manage 
to do so without normative judgment. They may evaluate social 
behavior as successful or unsuccessful in furthering their goals, but not 
in terms of right or wrong. (de Waal 2014, 200)
The basic point here is that what de Waal calls “normative judgment” requires the 
ability to formulate and apply abstract moral principles across dissimilar situations. It 
requires the marriage of an affective mechanism activated by suffering and the ability 
to understand and apply moral principles. Recent research in primatology indicates that 
nonhuman primates cannot perform the abstraction and generalization needed to apply 
moral principles. Until de Waal can explain how human beings develop this cognitive 
capacity through the evolutionary process, his evolutionary moral sentimentalism 
contains a major lacuna.
 Conclusion 
De Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism comes with problems. Nevertheless, 
one gains a valuable perspective by using it as a lens through which to examine the 
recent Planet of the Apes reboots. The correlation between de Waal’s evolutionary 
moral sentimentalism and the evolution of morality in the reboots is clear. Many of the 
necessary steps for transitioning from reactive emotions to the founding and sustaining of 
a moral community are seen in the two films. We observe, for example, Caesar’s capacity 
for reactive, though local, attitudes, such as when he protects his grandfather from an 
angry neighbor. We then see Caesar expand his sympathies as he begins to have similar 
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attitudes toward all his fellow great apes, for example, when he shares cookies equally 
among the entire primate shelter, or when he refuses to kill Koba because “ape not kill 
ape.” Caesar develops truly moral notions, and, once his compatriots experience similar 
cognitive increases, they display expanded sympathies as well.23 This allows the apes to 
establish a moral community that understands and applies abstract (disinterested) moral 
principles. 
I have argued that recent research suggests that, while primates exhibit reactive 
attitudes, self-control, and other protomoral capacities, they are incapable of abstraction 
and disinterestedness. However, the movies offer an imaginary glimpse into how these 
truly “moral” capacities develop. Once an individual acquires this ability and forms 
a community of agents with the potential for disinterested moral emotions, it seems 
natural to foster those emotions in the group through education, specifically, the 
communication of certain abstract principles that reflect the group’s sympathies.
However, this ability to form a community based on abstract principles that stem 
from impartial moral judgments also defines a boundary between primate social behavior 
and human morality. The boundary certainly is fluid, but it helps us to recognize the 
nature of truly moral emotions. Moral emotions require abstract reasoning and 
disinterestedness, and, until research proves otherwise, we have good reason to conclude 
that our planet lacks any apes with an abstract moral code.
23. It is interesting to note, however, that Caesar’s moral sympathies and his commitment to moral ideals is 
much greater than in his conspecifics. Clearly he has been treated kindly in the human home in which 
he was raised, and he has been morally educated in that environment. Comrades like Koba were not so 
fortunate, and their moral capacities reflect their upbringing.
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